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Abstract
The term “social exclusion” is defined. Research on social
exclusion, undertaken in Britain, with particular refer-
ence to the situation of ethnic minorities and refugees is re-
viewed. It is argued that the phenomenon of social
exclusion must be understood in a global context. Inequa-
lity, social exclusion, ethnic conflict, and terrorist activi-
ties, while not caused by globalization, have been greatly
exacerbated by recent changes in the world system. The
immigration and anti-terrorist measures adopted after 11
September are criticized, and policies that are needed to
remedy the consequences of social exclusion are proposed.
Résumé
Le terme « marginalisation » est défini. Les recherches en-
treprises en Grande-Bretagne sur la marginalisation,
tout particulièrement sur la situation des minorités ethni-
ques et des réfugiés, sont passées en revue. On soutient
que le phénomène de marginalisation doit être considéré
dans un contexte global. Bien qu’il soit vrai que les inéga-
lités, la marginalisation, les conflits ethniques et les activi-
tés terroristes ne découlent pas de la globalisation, ces
phénomènes ont cependant été exacerbés par les change-
ments récents intervenus dans le système mondial. Les
mesures adoptées après le 11 septembre dans le domaine
de l’immigration et de la lutte anti-terroriste sont criti-
quées et des politiques nécessaires pour remédier aux con-
séquences de la marginalisation sont proposées.
Definition of Social Exclusion
The term “social exclusion” was originally adopted bythe European Commission to describe the inequali-ties, and the barriers to full participation in otherwise
affluent societies, characteristic of countries experiencing a
post-industrial revolution.1 Academic sociologists adopted
the terminology, insisting that social exclusion is not the
same as poverty.2 It means not sharing the same opportuni-
ties as the majority. This may be due to social isolation, as
in the case of the elderly or disabled, or through discrimina-
tion based on nationality, language, “race,” or religion. The
denial of human rights to any category of persons is also a
form of social exclusion.
In its most extreme form exclusion leads to genocide, i.e.,
the systematic large-scale extermination of a racial group
or ethno-religious groups perceived as threatening the ma-
jority or a rival group. Since the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia, the term “ethnic cleansing” has been used to
describe such attempts. Other less extreme manifestations
lead to the partition of territory, the expulsion, exile, or
deportation of minorities, and/or the repatriation of those
previously allowed refuge or temporary asylum status.
Struggles for power between rival ethnic groups have be-
come militarized in the post-Cold War era, as formerly
totalitarian regimes lose their dictatorial control and mo-
nopoly of weapons. Terrorism is one result. Victims of such
political turmoil may flee  the  country but  they do  not
necessarily find a welcome elsewhere.
While states reserve the right to control movement
across borders and endeavour to prevent “illegal” immigra-
tion, migration occurs with or without legal sanction. Peo-
ple move from less developed to developed countries and
regions, to perform menial or dirty work, supply field
labour for agro-business, provide domestic services, or
work in the sex trade. Many are victims of unscrupulous
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traffickers and smugglers. The victims of political and eth-
nic power struggles account for the large-scale movements
of refugees that have occurred in eastern and central Eu-
rope, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Developed countries
in western Europe, North America, and Australasia are
reluctant to give asylum to all those who flee persecution or
seek to escape the economic and environmental disasters
that occurred in the wake of such conflicts. Many displaced
persons, as well as so-called “economic migrants,” are being
denied protection, because of a strict and narrow interpre-
tation of the Geneva Convention criteria for full refugee
status. Since September 2001, even more restrictive measu-
res have been adopted in the name of improved security.
Various practices are used by wealthier countries to ma-
nage and control population movements.  They involve
classifying people according to their perceived eligibility to
enter, or remain in, a particular territory. This is what has
been called a form of “global apartheid.”3 The instruments
for the enforcement of global apartheid are interdiction,
passports, visas, residence permits, work permits, denial of
citizenship rights, including access to education, govern-
ment-funded health and welfare services, etc. The forcible
repatriation of refugees to so-called “safe third countries”
is now standard practice, together with the deportation of
“illegal” immigrants. These forms of state control of immigra-
tion are seen as a legitimate response tothe destabilizing effects
of large-scale migration. They are discriminatory by “race”
because  the  majority of refugees and asylum  applicants
come from, and are obliged to remain in, Third World coun-
tries. Only a few actually reach Europe and North America.
In contrast, capital moves freely around the world, and
entrepreneurs with money to invest have little difficulty
obtaining residence permits, immigrant status, or even ci-
tizenship of the countries they wish to operate in. Special
immigration programs for entrepreneurs, investors, and
the highly qualified are examples of this. It is not so easy for
those who bring only their labour, or who are deemed alien
in language, culture, or religion. When not labelled illegal
and imprisoned or deported, such workers find only low
paid employment in manual jobs, often clandestine em-
ployment below the minimum wage.
The situation is currently aggravated by the structural
changes that are taking place in the global capitalist system
as a result of technological innovation, international com-
petition, and the availability of cheap labour in developing
countries, where tax and duty-free manufacturing enclaves
are set up. Worldwide economic recession further exacer-
bates the situation. The dismantling of the “welfare state,”
privatizing of many services, and the removal of established
“safety nets” and the substitution of “workfare,” are all
symptomatic of a shifting balance of power in the global
system. The consequent vogue for “downsizing,” and the
deindustrialization of advanced societies, has ironic conse-
quences. Blue-collar and other workers in declining indus-
tries experience extreme insecurity. There is a consequent
reaction against employment equity and affirmative action
programs, which previously favoured women and visible
minorities. Young males with little education, whether im-
migrant or native-born, also see themselves as victims of
systemic discrimination. When unemployment is high the
result is alienation, xenophobia, and increasing support for
a right-wing political agenda. Some young people are at-
tracted to neo-fascist movements and, in  certain cases,
fundamentalist religions. Racial and ethnic prejudices are
inflamed. Britain in the last decade provides a good
example of this phenomenon.
The U.K. Experience
The term “social exclusion” gained currency in Britain un-
der New Labour. It led to the establishment of several aca-
demic research units, as well as a government unit advising
on social policies.4 The main focus  of  research at  these
institutions has been on youth policy, the chronically unem-
ployed, the aged, single mothers, child poverty, and condi-
tions in deteriorating housing estates with high crime rates.
Surprisingly, until quite recently, the problems facing ethnic
minorities have been largely neglected by researchers stu-
dying social exclusion.5
Studies in the U.K. have distinguished four dimensions
of social exclusion, viz.: (1) exclusion from adequate in-
come or resources; (2) labour-market exclusion; (3) service
exclusion; and (4) exclusion from social relations. On all
these dimensions ethnic minorities are more severely disad-
vantaged. One survey, carried out by a team of researchers
in Birmingham, compared four groups: whites born in the
U.K., compared with those of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, or
Afro-Caribbean origin or parentage. The study showed that
the ethnic minority groups were all over-represented in the
low-income population. Nationally, households with Pa-
kistani or Bangladeshi heads were also more likely to have
no member in the workforce, high rates of unemployment,
and the lowest household incomes.6 Other research in Bri-
tain has drawn attention to the widespread incidence of
racism and Islamophobia. Institutionalized racism is evi-
dent in the police and prison services. There is discrimina-
tion in the housing and job markets. Since 11 September,
Islamic communities have been rendered even more vulne-
rable.
Islamic Communities in the U.K.
Given the events of 11 September, and the apparent invol-
vement of some British-born Muslims with the Taliban in
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Afghanistan, it is interesting to consider the situation of
Islamic communities in that country. The Islamic popula-
tion is estimated to be approximately nine hundred thou-
sand, or 1.5 per cent of the population of the U.K. They are
an ethnically diverse population, including immigrants
from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, their children born
in Britain, and some British-born converts. The majority of
Muslims are from Pakistan and Bangladesh, or are the U.K.-
born descendants of immigrants from those countries. Most
of those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin are geographi-
cally concentrated in the poorest neighbourhoods in Lon-
don, West Yorkshire, and Greater Manchester. Other
Islamic centres are located in the Midlands, including Bir-
mingham, Tipton, and Leicester. There is also a high degree
of concentration of Islamic immigrants within these cities
and metro areas. West Yorkshire and the Greater Manches-
ter area (including Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley, where
race riots occurred in the summer of 2001) accounted for 27
per cent of all Pakistani origin and 11 per cent of Bangla-
deshi. Residential segregation within these cities is also very
marked.
A dramatic example of the consequences of social exclu-
sion and deprivation in Britain were the race riots that
broke out in the late summer of 2001, before the terrorist
attacks of 11 September. They occurred in Bradford, York-
shire, followed soon after by further violence in Oldham
and Burnley. These were once thriving towns, built around
the textile manufacturing industry in the north of England.
They attracted  large numbers of  Indian, Pakistani,  and
Bangladeshi immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s at a time of
low unemployment and labour shortages in Britain. There
is now a large second generation, in their teens and young
adult years. However, the post-industrial revolution and
globalization left these towns and their inhabitants behind.
As a consequence of globalization, textile manufacturing
moved to the Third World. Poverty and unemployment are
now exceptionally high and ethnic tensions severe in these
towns in the north of England.
There is a huge gap between the relatively wealthy region
of London and the south, and the northern towns with their
crumbling housing stock and squalid neighbourhoods. In
fact, the wealth gap between the rich southeast and the poor
north is larger than the regional divide in any other Eu-
ropean country.7 Midland towns which have Islamic mino-
rities, such as Leicester and Tipton, have also experienced
high unemployment following a downturn in the automo-
bile industry. Manufacturing industries have declined in
importance in Britain. In 1966 they accounted for 35 per
cent of the labour force; by 1997 the proportion was only
25.6 per cent and is still falling. It is now close to 20 per cent.
Textile industries were particularly affected by globaliza-
tion and competition from Third World countries (inclu-
ding, ironically, Pakistan!). Consequently unemployment
levels in these areas are very high. In some parts of Oldham
and Bradford, where Asian immigrants are located, unem-
ployment is as high as 40 per cent. Housing conditions in
many neighbourhoods have deteriorated to the point of
dereliction and imminent slum clearance.
A study was commissioned by the Rowntree Foundation,
some time before the riots occurred. It concluded that:
[T]he Asian communities, particularly the Muslim community,
are concerned that racism and Islamophobia continue to blight
their lives resulting in harassment, discrimination and exclu-
sion. People’s negative attitudes about each other are formed
and influenced in education, through the media, family and
friends, and on the streets.8
By a cruel irony, the race riots broke out just as this report
was about to be released. It included a long list of recom-
mendations for improving community relations in
Bradford. The riots were initiated by right-wing nationalists
and led to several nights of violence, property damage, and
clashes with the police. These were followed by similar
violence in other northern towns. Since then a debate
among policy makers has been concerned with the exist-
ence of a number of schools in which almost all the children
attending from the immediate neighbourhood are of one
ethno-religious background. The recent establishment of a
separate school for Muslim girls is particularly controver-
sial. It is feared that it will exacerbate existing barriers to
communication and understanding between the Islamic
community and others in the city. The existence of publicly
funded schools run by the Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish
faiths adds to the separation of young people of different
ethno-religious background. Forthcoming legislation
would permit the establishment of more faith-based
schools. It has been severely criticized by those who fear
even greater residential segregation and social isolation of
Islamic communities and barriers to full inclusion of ethnic
minority children.
Another report written after the riots had occurred
highlighted the consequences of  residential  segregation.
The researchers were particularly struck by the physical
segregation and depth of polarization of the towns:
Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary
bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and
cultural networks, means that many communities operate on
the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives do not seem to
touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaning-
ful interchanges.9
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The problems facing Islamic and other immigrants, par-
ticularly recent refugees and asylum applicants, is not limi-
ted to Bradford, or other parts of Britain. Other European
countries, including France and Germany, are facing simi-
lar problems of social exclusion and conflict. Various stu-
dies have noted the rise of anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic
attitudes and behaviour in Europe and the consequential
growth of political activism, as minorities address the pro-
blems created by economic insecurity and social exclusion.
Transnational networks link ethnic, including Islamic,
communities worldwide. Young men who feel excluded
and alienated from society in one locality may be tempted
to join wider extremist movements, or fundamentalist cau-
ses, inspired by the idea of ‘jihad’; or, in the case of white
youths, they may support the exaggerated nationalism
preached by neo-fascist organizations.10
In the British government’s own statements concerning
“social exclusion” there is an emphasis on citizenship, which
is understood to carry with it duties and moral obligations,
as well as rights. The official response of the Home Office
Minister, following the riots in Bradford and other north-
ern towns, was to say that immigrants should be made to
take an oath of allegiance to the Crown, overlooking the fact
that most of those engaged in violent clashes were born in
Britain. In fact, such a view was immediately endorsed by
the extreme right-wing British National Party, whose mem-
bers had been active in instigating the violence. The empha-
sis on “citizenship,” and its responsibilities, also enables the
government to “crack down” on alleged “welfare fraud,” as
well as on those it considers ineligible for the benefits of a
welfare society, particularly so-called “illegal immigrants”
and asylum seekers. When the latter are not imprisoned, or
detained in segregated camps, they are eligible for a much
lower rate of social benefits than the rest of the population
in the U.K. They are also forced to disperse, from London
and the southeast of England, to the run-down housing estates
in the north of the country, including Scotland. In Glasgow,
this led to clashes between asylum applicants and local resi-
dents, leading to the stabbing death of one asylum-seeker.
As well as denying refugee status to the majority of those
who apply, the British government has also tried in vain to
prevent illegal immigrants and asylum seekers from en-
tering the country from France and other European coun-
tries. Many attempt to do so by stowing away on
cross-channel ships, trains, and trucks and by endeavouring
to walk through the Channel tunnel from camps run by the
Red Cross in France. Punitive fines against those found
guilty of carrying illegal migrants, knowingly or unknowin-
gly, have  been criticized by the courts as excessive and
unfair. (The British government has since lifted the penal-
ties on the Euro-Tunnel). When caught on the English side
of  the  Channel, migrants are held in detention  centres
(mostly former prisons). Those considered to have a prima
facie case for refugee status (including in some cases unac-
companied children) are then sent to public housing estates
in the north, pending the outcome of their refugee hearing,
which can take months, or years if there is an appeal. A new
Immigration Bill, introduced in April 2002, closes so-called
loopholes in immigration and asylum law and introduces
tough penalties for trafficking. Some of its key provisions
are summarized in Chart 1. In the House of Lords, the bill
was amended in order to improve housing provision for
asylum seekers, prevent school segregation, and limit the
grounds for deportation. However, it is expected that the
government will use its majority in the House of Commons
to overturn these amendments when the bill returns to the
Commons for final approval.
Global Dimension of Social Exclusion
What is lacking in the usual definition of “social exclusion”
is a recognition that countries such as Britain, the rest of the
European Union, Canada, the United States, and other
OECD countries are the affluent part of a world system. It is
true that there are huge gaps between the rich and the poor
within these advanced industrial countries. Visible minori-
ties and  recent  immigrants are particularly  likely to  fall
below the poverty line, however that is defined. Single mo-
thers and the elderly are also vulnerable. However, the ine-
qualities, which undoubtedly exist within these countries,
pale in significance when compared with the inequalities
between them and the rest of the world. Poverty in Britain,
Canada, and other OECD countries is a relative concept and
has no similarity to the absolute levels of deprivation expe-
rienced in the Third World (see Chart 2). The average gross
domestic product per capita of the advanced industrial
countries is $27,510. This compares with $23,557 for the
U.K. and less than $500 for Africa south of the Sahara and
$460 in south Asia. Even within the NAFTA region there are
huge discrepancies.  The GDP per capita  for the U.S.  is
$33,900, compared with $25,900 for Canada and only
$8,100 for Mexico. The average for the whole of Latin Ame-
rica and the Caribbean is only $3,860.
There is a close connection between low levels of income
and the incidence of violent conflict, including civil war.
Afghanistan, in particular, has experienced both external
and internal conflict, including invasion by the Soviet
Union and, more recently, the United States and its allies,
in the “war against terrorism.” It is not surprising that
Afghanistan has been the source of the largest concentra-
tion of refugees, located in camps in Iran and Pakistan. The
numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees grew
even more as a result of American bombing.
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• Power to search and detain suspected illegal immigrants
• Power to remove children born in U.K., if parents entered illegally
• Restricted rights of appeal against deportation
• New ID measures to be introduced at border controls
• Physical recognition equipment authorized to discover false identities
• New criminal offence of people trafficking for prostitution, & assisting illegal immigration
• Maximum penalty for harbouring unlawful immigrant up to 14 years
• New tiered system of Centres to house asylum seekers
• Limits obligation of local education authorities to provide schooling for children in Centres
• Airlines must obtain clearance for passengers before they begin journey to U.K.
• Banks, employers and public authorities must share information concerning suspected illegal entrants
• New citizenship ceremony and oath of allegiance
• New language, and knowledge of life in the UK, qualification for naturalization
• Power to deprive citizenship, if person has done anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the U.K.
(If the Secretary of State deems information should not be made public, right to appeal limited.)
Chart 1
U.K. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill, 2002
Chart 2
Gross national income per capita: Year 2000
U.S. dollars
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When all those of concern to the UNHCR are conside-
red, including the internally displaced and returnees, Asian
countries carry the heaviest burden, followed closely by
Africa and the Middle East. There are an estimated 11.7
million “Convention” refugees and many externally and
internally displaced persons today. Thus the UNHCR re-
ported nearly 22 million persons of concern to that agency
in 2001 (See Chart 3). To these must be added another 3.8
million Palestinians under the care of the UNRWA. Even
before the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan that country was the
largest single source of refugees in the world. There were
3.6 million Afghan refugees mainly located in camps on the
borders with Pakistan and Iran. There were a further
750,000 displaced persons in Afghanistan in January 2001.
The numbers have grown substantially since the war. The
number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan reaching the
west is small by comparison.
Refugees and asylum applicants are particularly vulnera-
ble as a consequence of exclusion from fundamental human
rights and the benefits of a welfare society. The number of
asylum applications submitted in advanced industrial
countries fluctuates annually as do the numbers accepted
for full Convention refugee status, or other (mainly tempo-
rary) humanitarian status. The Convention status accep-
tance rate in the European Union averages 14 per cent. This
compares with 46 per  cent in Canada. The number of
asylum seekers applying in Britain rose until the year 2000
when there were 80,315 about whom decisions were finalized,
of whom 12 per cent received full refugee status and 11 per
cent “exceptional leave to remain,” i.e., temporary status. The
number of asylum seekers fell slightly in 2001 to 72,000
(excluding dependants). The trends in asylum applications for
selected countries are shown in Chart 4.
At the same time the number of refugees actually
reaching Europe declined between 1992 and 1996, due to
interdiction and the imposition of visa requirements. The
latter were so drastic that the UNHCR Policy Unit expres-
sed concern that it was becoming almost impossible for
genuine asylum seekers to obtain legal entrance to an EU
country, forcing people to adopt clandestine methods and
to fall victim to unscrupulous traffickers.11 However, the
number applying for refugee status in Europe has risen
again in the last five years. At a summit meeting in June
2002, the EU rejected a hard-line position on asylum see-
kers proposed by Britain and Spain. The latter would have
penalized Third World countries that failed to stem the flow
of migrants to Europe. Instead, it was agreed that countries
should be given incentives to stop outflows of migrants
rather than be punished with cuts to vital aid budgets.
Nevertheless, new proposals for joint immigration policing
operations at external borders represent another step to-
ward a “Fortress Europe.” Exclusionary policies may as-
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Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR: 2001
N = 21,793,000 (includes returnees & internally displaced)
Source: UNHCR (does not include 3.8 million Palestinians in care of UNRWA)
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suage the xenophobic Right but they will not solve the
problem. There is a need for a common European definition
of “asylum seeker,” and one that is more rather than less
generous than at present.
Governments now use advanced technologies to main-
tain data banks on suspected terrorists, known criminals,
asylum applicants, and alleged “illegal” immigrants. They
institute “early warning systems” against mass migration,
train airline officials in the checking of documents to faci-
litate interdiction, and enforce the “non-exodus” of un-
wanted populations. Electronic fences replace barbed wire
and brick walls, while police and soldiers continue to back
up immigration officials at borders, and gunboats support
the coast guards as they herd people into internment camps,
pending repatriation. The exclusion of refugees and asylum
applicants recently reached dramatic and tragic propor-
tions in the case of Australia’s treatment of “boat people”
escaping from Afghanistan and other Asian countries. Last
year, several ships were prevented from reaching Australian
territory. Instead they were escorted to remote Pacific is-
lands where the UNHCR processed their refugee claims,
without any commitment from the Australian government
to accept those deemed to be victims of persecution. Asy-
lum applicants who do succeed in reaching Australia are
placed in remote camps under conditions that have given
rise to hunger strikes, suicide, and other protests. These
actions represent an exclusionist approach to refugees and
asylum seekers which is at variance with the multicultural
policies espoused by previous Australian governments.12
Even before the events of 11 September 2001, increased
migration pressures, legal and illegal, led to a tightening of
regulations in most developed countries, together with new
legislation designed to deter migration, interdict undocu-
mented travellers, reinforce border controls, and penalize
airlines, shipping companies, and truckers if they are dis-
covered to have knowingly, or unknowingly, carried pas-
sengers who do not have a legal right of entry. Canada
introduced Bill C-31, which died when an election was
called in October 2000. It was reintroduced as Bill C-11 and
further amended in 2001. The new law increases the powers
of immigration officers to refuse entry to Canada on
grounds of criminality, security risk, or forged or inade-
quate  identity  documents.  It  imposes higher maximum
penalties for human smuggling, and places the responsibi-
lity on airlines to identify and inform Canadian authorities
concerning passengers who may be inadmissible to Canada.
Special efforts have been made to punish those involved
in the organized smuggling of illegal immigrants across
borders. The number of interdictions and removals from
Canada has been increasing annually and Bill C-11, when
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Chart 4
Asylum Applications: Selected Countries (1992–2001)
Source: UNHCR Statistical Unit (excludes dependents)
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fully  implemented,  will lead to a  further increase. It  is
designed to partially “harmonize” Canada’s laws and admi-
nistrative procedures with those of the United States and
other countries. The concept of a “safe third country” has
been institutionalized, requiring asylum seekers to apply in
the first country they enter after flight from persecution.
Whether or not the new immigration law protects the rights
of Convention refugees and others will largely depend on
how the new regulations are administered and appeals dealt
with. A major concern is that people genuinely in need of
protection will be forced to return to situations where they
risk persecution or serious deprivation.
Various countries have introduced legislation that requi-
res refugees to be fingerprinted, restricts access by asylum
applicants to public housing, permits deportation where an
asylum claim has been refused, and requires airlines, or
other carriers, to ensure that travellers hold a visa to enter,
or even to pass through, one country en route to another.
Potential refugees must have their asylum claims processed
in the first “safe country” they land in. This gives rise to the
phenomenon of “refugees in orbit” when no country wishes
to accept them. Canada’s interpretation of the UN Conven-
tion definition of a refugee has been more generous than
that of some other countries.
There is growing fear, in Europe and North America, of
large-scale economic migration from developing counties,
induced by poverty and a sense of relative deprivation
compared with the evident affluence of the West. Terro-
rists’ threats and concerns about security have added to
these apprehensions. Attempts to limit the flow of illegal
economic migrants, refugees, and asylum applicants are
part of a growing nostalgia for a less complicated world in
which people felt secure in homogeneous communities,
where neighbours shared “traditional” values. They are also
a reaction to the insecurity felt by many who are faced with
a rapidly changing global society. This is evident in the growth
of racism, xenophobia, and religious and ethnic conflict in
various countries, including those which have traditionally
been receptive to both political and economic migrants.
Conclusion
The world is now a total system experiencing radical struc-
tural changes, political, economic, and social. The impact of
these changes is particularly evident in respect of transpor-
tation, communication, and the transmission of informa-
tion and pictorial images. However, although money, goods,
and services may move relatively freely, people do not.
Processes of inclusion and exclusion occur both within and
between countries and regions. Irrespective of geographic
distance, some individuals and collectivities are fully incor-
porated into the advanced industrial economy of this emer-
ging global system, while others are marginalized or rejected
altogether. Feelings of insecurity, and absolute or relative
deprivation, lead to prejudice and ethnic conflict and to
struggles for power, often precipitating violence.
The power struggle involves not only the boundaries of
states, as traditionally understood, but also the boundaries
between corporations and states, which are becoming harder
to define as governments engage in “trade missions” to
promote exports and facilitate transnational investment.
Not least among the factors sustaining ethnic conflict and
civil war is the hugely lucrative trade in weapons and other
military equipment.13 At present, the U.S., Britain, Canada,
and other OECD countries subsidize their own arms ma-
nufacturers and encourage them to export small, interme-
diate, and powerful weapons, even to those countries
engaged in civil war or aggression against their neighbours,
giving rise to huge refugee problems.
There is a conflict of interest between those who wish to
eliminate borders in the interest of trade and profit, and
those who want borders to be reinforced in order to gua-
rantee security from terrorism as well as to deter illegal
immigration. In the U.S., Canada, Britain, and the Eu-
ropean Union new measures have been introduced to deal
with terrorist threats. Ethnic minorities in these countries,
irrespective  of  their  legal  status in those countries, feel
insecure, as do many majority group members faced with
the uncertainties of a post-September 11 world.14
How is global social exclusion to be combatted? First and
foremost, every effort must be made to ensure that the
economic benefits of globalization are more equitably
spread and that inequalities are reduced, both those within
and between countries, regions, and continents. The new
global division of labour must benefit the developing world,
as well as those who are already wealthy. Within the weal-
thier countries, regional disparities must be reduced and
opportunities found for those who have been left behind by
globalization. Humanitarian aid should be increased. No
developed country allocates anything like the UN-recom-
mended proportion (0.7 per cent) of GNP to assist develo-
ping countries. More  often than not the assistance is a
disguised form of subsidy to the industrialized countries’
own corporations seeking export opportunities. The actual
percentage is only 0.22 per cent, representing a shortfall of
one-hundred billion dollars annually.
Given the pressure to migrate, cross-border population
movements must be facilitated through bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements that ensure reciprocity in all dimen-
sions of human rights. As a first step, the ratification of the
ILO draft “Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families” by
Canada, the U.S., and other industrialized countries is im-
Social Exclusion

portant. This would go a long way toward removing some
of the abuses currently associated with the employment of
temporary workers.15 As recommended by the UN Com-
mission on Global Governance, there is a need for a “more
comprehensive institutionalized co-operation,” or multila-
teral management of international migration. The positive
benefits of migration must be recognized and facilitated.
Rather than imposing restrictions that only encourage clan-
destine migration, governments must facilitate temporary
and permanent cross-border movements. Governments
must promote a sense of civic pride and citizenship while,
at the same time, promoting knowledge and understanding
of the world system, or “global neighbourhood,” to which
we all belong. This calls for “a common commitment to
core values that all humanity could uphold: respect for life,
liberty, justice and equity, mutual respect, caring and inte-
grity”.16
Above all, we must not allow the panic which followed
the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington to result
in a closing of borders, a persecution of Islamic or other
ethnic minorities, or a diminished concern for human
rights, justice, and fairness. There must be respect for UN
Conventions and the Charter of Rights. We must ensure the
full social inclusion of minorities and marginalized peoples.
Ultimately it is a question of belonging, or not belonging,
in the emerging world system.
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